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A risk adjustment system is a necessary prerequi-
site for competition between health plans or sick-
ness funds. It is only unnecessary in a national
insurance plan or in a system with risk-related pre-
miums. Risk adjustment primarily serves the pur-
poses of preventing or, as far as possible, restricting
risk selection between the sickness funds and en-
ouraging them and the service providers to act
along cost-effective lines (Van de Ven and Ellis
2000).Therefore, competition does not constitute a
goal in itself, but an instrument for achieving effi-
cient and effective health care provision based on
the preferences of the insured. Competition bet-
ween sickness funds is largely designed to spill-over
to the benefits sector and to improve the provision
of health benefits. Viewed from this perspective,
risk adjustment possesses a merely instrumental
character.Firstly,it constitutes a means of achieving
competition and secondly, it impacts only indirectly
the efficiency and effectiveness of health care pro-
vision. As a consequence, the reform of the risk
adjustment system is not done “for its own sake”.In
other words, the aim should not be find-ing the
maximum degree of differentiation, but it is rather
an “optimum” risk adjustment system that is
intended.
The problems of self-selection and risk selection in
health insurance markets are common to social
health insurance systems where premium payments
do not depend on the individual risk of the insured
but instead premiums are, e.g., community rated or
depend on earned income (Cutler and Zeckhauser
2000).With the use of risk-adjustment schemes, reg-
ulators aim at lowering or even removing any incen-
tives for insurers for cream skimming, i.e., to attract
only those individuals with low health risks and to
reject those with higher risks. One way to deal with
this problem is to introduce an obligation to contract
for insurers and to ban risk differentiation of premi-
ums. Nevertheless, because of the remaining oppor-
tunities to select the insured, factors that correlate
with the individual risk are used to correct payments
from and to insurers, thereby seeking to eliminate
any incentives to select individuals.
The factors on which adjustment schemes are based
on vary between different countries.One tendency is
that regulators aim at a perfect risk adjustment
mechanism.By doing so,different strategies and risk
factors are used. Generally, risk adjustment should
provide a basis for a more competitive health insur-
ance system. In the sense of performance-oriented
competition risk adjustment schemes primarily serve
the purpose of preventing or, as far as possible, re-
stricting risk selection on the part of the health plans,
and encouraging plans and benefit providers to act
along cost-effective lines.
In contrast to the health insurance systems in the
United States and Switzerland, in the existing
German statutory health insurance system the health
funds possess relatively few risk selection tools,mean-
ing that greater differentiation of the risk structure
equalization system for the purpose of avoiding this
danger does not appear urgently necessary. Never-
theless, there is a plan to introduce an intensified
adjustment system beginning in 2009 that aims at bet-
ter incorporating morbidity aspects of the patients.
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** University of Mannheim.Risk adjustment in selected countries
The US experience
In contrast to other countries, the health insurance
system in the US rests more upon private elements.
Nevertheless, there are public health programs like
Medicare or Medicaid where risk selection may be a
problem due to community-rated premiums or pos-
sible risk selection by providers. Hence, in these sys-
tems, formal risk adjustment models are used to
reduce incentives for risk selection (Glazer and
McGuire 2006; McGuire 2007, 84).
A closer look at the US health insurance market
shows that in 2006,54 percent of the total population
(296.1 million) had employer-sponsored insurance,
12 percent were insured by Medicaid or other public
systems, 14 percent by Medicare and 5 percent had
other private insurance plans (Kaiser Family Foun-
dation 2008). About 16 percent of the population
had no health insurance at all.
Looking at the enrollees,about 60 million people are
enrolled in a private health insurance plan whereas
only 15.3 million are enrolled in Medicare or Me-
dicaid.1 In private health plans formal risk adjust-
ment is hardly used. Instead, they rely on selective
contracting and negotiations to fight inefficiencies
due to risk selection. In public programs, formal risk
selection formulas are predominant. The Medicaid
program uses a payment system with a comparative-
ly simple adjustment scheme that can be differenti-
ated by eligibility.
Medicare is a program that defines rules for pay-
ments of qualified plans and providers.Compared to
the Medicaid system, the risk adjustment formula in
the Medicare program is more complex (Kominski
2007). The task is to bring in line the payments to
providers or premiums to health plans with the
expected costs of providing the agreed services for
the individual patient. The payments to providers
differ by type of provider and by benefit bundles.
Moreover, physician professional services are ex-
cluded from the payment bundle. For providers,
prospective payments were introduced to encourage
efficiency of delivering care. The payments are ad-
justed for personal characteristics of the patient so
that providers that restrict themselves to necessary
treatments are rewarded and those with excessive
prescriptions are penalized. In the managed care
option of Medicare, private plans enroll Medicare
beneficiaries and provide the contracted benefits.
Therefore, they receive a monthly premium that dif-
fers by beneficiaries’ individual risks and covers
attributes due to the risk adjustment formula.
Payments to providers
As already noted, provider payments differ with re-
spect to patient’s characteristics and risk.Therefore,
a patient classification system is used (Kominski
2007, 5). It is associated with the provider type and
results in case mix groups, i.e., categories of patients
which are similar with respect to treatment cases.For
a particular type of provider the average costs of
patient in a group are compared to the average costs
for all groups. The risk-adjustment formula of
Medicare uses this ratio as a relative weight to adjust
the standard provider payment for a certain type of
provider.
Since treatment costs differ between providers and
with respect to risk factors, different classification
systems exist for different types of providers. The
individual risk adjusters are age, gender, Medicaid
status, and diagnosis from hospital claims in the pre-
vious year (McGuire 2007,88).For instance,patients
treated in an acute care hospital are classified on
basis of their diagnosis-related group (DRG).
Moreover, for hospital services, the relative weights
differ because of different types with varying treat-
ments and cost structures (Kominski 2007, 6). The
required data on patient-level information are
reported using codes on diagnostic and treatment
information from the ICD-9-CM.The functional sta-
tus for classifying for Skilled Nursing facilities,home
health agencies and rehabilitation hospitals are
derived from assessment tools.The obtained relative
weights for the case mix groups are then used to
adjust the prospective base payments for the
provider type.
Plan payments
Starting in the mid-eighties, beneficiaries of the
Medicare program were able to choose between tra-
ditional Medicare where treatments are remunerat-
ed on a fee-for-service basis or to be enrolled in a
participating health plan that receives a risk-adjust-
ed capitation premium for more comprehensive ser-
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vices (McGuire 2007, 88).2 The procedure of risk-
adjustment is comparable to the one for provider
payments: the beneficiaries have to be assigned to a
group of patients and for each group there exist rel-
ative weights (Kominiski 2007, 8). The community-
rated premium is then adjusted using the relative
weights.3
Before the introduction of the relative weights that
are based on a patient classification system, risk-
adjustment for premiums only took demographic
differences across enrollees into account. Starting in
1985,the first classification system was based on age,
gender and other demographic characteristics.
Moreover, institutional status and Medicaid eligibil-
ity were taken into account but information on
health status or clinical conditions was missing.
Problems of risk adjustment in Medicare
Because of ongoing advances in medical technology,
diagnostics and treatment strategies and the re-
sponses of providers to the remuneration system,the
risk-adjustment formula has to be enhanced. One
problem is that even within the defined risk cate-
gories there is variation between the included indi-
viduals (Kominski 2007, 9). One source of variation
in costs may be an imprecise patient classification
system that fails to distinguish adequately among the
beneficiaries. For a better classification, more infor-
mation is needed. Although for payments to acute
care hospitals almost 600 DRGs are used, it is possi-
ble that patient severity within one DRG is not
accounted for. It follows that some patients within a
DRG are more profitable than others.But an expan-
sion of patient groups is only favorable as long as the
variability within groups is reduced and additional
groups improve the accuracy of payments, account-
ing for a significant proportion of the variance in
cost differences (Kominski 2007, 9–10). In addition,
there are diminishing returns to additional groups in
the adjustment formula that outweigh the improved
precision that also requires additional patient data.
Another issue is concerned with changes in treat-
ment and diagnosis over time. If we observe differ-
ent medical practices and therefore changing costs,
the adjustment formula and the classification system
need to be revised.Again,due to data problems (i.e.,
data are not available or adequate for modifying the
system) differences in treatment are dealt better
with payment adjustments.4
The last two issues deal with the provision and
billing of the services provided. First, in the prospec-
tive payment systems (PPS) bundles, the units range
from a day of care in a psychiatric hospital up to
60 days for home health care. Providers might have
an incentive to shift at least some of the services out-
side of the bundle for reducing cost and increasing
profitability. Medicare handles this problem by
defining the bundle to include all services provided
from the provider and three-days prior to admission.
Second, there are incentives to upgrade treated
patients in a higher category even though the
resource needs are not comparable to the average
patient in that category (up coding). Providers use
any changes in the risk factors to ensure that the
patient is assigned to those case mix groups that
yield higher revenue. Medicare’s task therefore is to
establish risk factors that cannot be used for up cod-
ing or gaming.
Switzerland
In 1996 competition in the Swiss social health insur-
ance was introduced. Based on community rated
premiums, the Federal Law on Health Insurance
(KVG) established that health plans compete for the
insured in the 26 cantons (Beck et al.2003,63).Prior
to this development was the introduction of a retro-
spective risk-adjustment scheme in 1993.As in other
countries, the aim was to reduce the incentives for
insurers to engage in risk selection.
Health insurance in Switzerland can be divided into
a mandatory basic insurance and a supplementary
private health insurance (Leu and Beck 2007, 120).
Both systems are based on the principle of individual
insurance,i.e.,each individual has to conclude a con-
tract with an insurer. At present, about 90 health
plans supply the market with mandatory insurance.5
Here, it is worth mentioning that not all insurers are
2 It should be noted that the alternative of enrolling in a health plan
never attracted more than 20 percent of beneficiaries. Moreover,
the initial intention that through this opportunity the program costs
might fall failed (McGuire 2007, 88).
3 Besides the premiums for Medicare managed care (Medicare
Advantage, Part C) also premiums for the prescription drug bene-
fit (Part D) are risk-adjusted (Kominski 2007, 8).
4 Kominski refers to the case in which one patient receives a new
procedure or method and therefore differs from patients who
receive this care only when it is established. He suggests outlier
payment, risk corridors or partial capitation payments as adequate
alternatives as long as the necessary data is not available (Kominski
2007, 11).
5 The market share of the four biggest insurers adds up to 80 per-
cent (Leu und Beck 2007, 121).present in every canton, on average there are about
40–60 insurers in a canton (Beck et al. 2003, 66).
The new law on health insurance introduced a high-
er degree of competition into the health care system
that is certainly comparable to the Netherlands after
2006 or to the situation in Germany after the latest
health care reform act.In theory there are three mar-
kets. The Swiss health care system combines public,
subsidized private and fully private health care in a
unique manner. Like most developed countries, the
Swiss health care system is funded through a combi-
nation of public and private sources. However, the
proportion of expenditure from public sources is one
of the lowest in Europe. Expenditure structure has
changed markedly over the past 20 years.Tax financ-
ing, health insurance financing and direct payments
approximately follow a one-third rule. The Swiss
health insurance system has three components:
mandatory basic insurance;voluntary supplementary
insurance; and disability insurance. All Swiss resi-
dents must have a mandatory basic health insurance.
Insurers are obliged to accept all applicants, thereby
avoiding cream-skimming at least in parts. Both reg-
istered health insurance funds and private insurers
are permitted to provide the compulsory basic insur-
ance so that the risk selection opportunities can be
viewed as broader than in other European countries
that have a more stringent separation between these
two types of insurers.
The Swiss basic package is quite comprehensive and
comparable to the scope of the benefits package in
Germany, for example. The main difference lies in
dental treatment, dentures and private accidents,
which are largely not included in the basic Swiss pack-
age, whereas alternative and complementary medi-
cine is included.There is an open enrollment policy,so
individuals can change their health plan every half
year.The coverage is comprehensive,a uniform bene-
fits catalogue exists, and premiums are community
rated and controlled by the Federal Office for the
Social Insurance (BSV). The health insurance law
defines the scope of the benefits package under com-
pulsory insurance.Benefits are standardized through-
out Switzerland. Services covered must meet criteria
of effectiveness, appropriateness and cost-efficiency.
Selective contracting has been possible since the 1996
law.All in all there is still little scope for competition
based on quality of service. Instead, insurers compete
on the basis of price – that is premiums and variable
deductibles. Switching between insurers is now more
common than under past legislation.
Premiums are federally regulated and independent
of income. They are community rated, that is, the
same for every person with a given company in a
given area, regardless of individual risks. Every fam-
ily member is insured individually, regardless of age.
However,all insurers offer premiums for dependents
up to age 25. Premiums vary from insurer to insurer
and may vary substantially from canton to canton.
Patients may also opt for bonus options for no claims
as in the German private health insurance market.
For those who cannot pay the premiums, i.e., their
premium would be more than roughly 10 percent of
income, the federal and local government pays
means-tested subsidies directly to the insured. At
present about 40 percent of the insured benefit from
such premium.
The Swiss health care system has co-payments in the
form of an annual minimum deductible called ordi-
nary franchise (SFR 300). Insurance companies can
offer deductibles up to SFR 2,500 at most. The in-
sured can reduce their premium by opting for one of
these higher optional deductibles.In order to protect
solidarity, premium reduction limits are set annually
by the federal government.
Risk adjustment in the Swiss system
Up to now the structure of the risk-adjustment sys-
tem in Switzerland has been rather simple.Main risk
indicators are age, gender and region because as
already mentioned insurance premiums may differ
between cantons. Hence, the Swiss system has a
demographic risk adjustment (Leu und Beck 2007,
124). Individuals are classified into categories with
respect to gender and age. For the latter risk indica-
tor there are 15 age groups starting from 19 to
25 years.6 Together, 30 risk classes are used in each
canton, which makes 780 classes for the whole coun-
try. The payments are calculated retrospectively in
each canton by calculating and comparing the aver-
age cost for all adult insured individuals with the
average costs for the risk class of an insurer. If the
average costs of a risk category are beyond those of
the whole canton, the insurer has to pay for the dif-
ference for each insured individual in this category
and vice versa.From 2002 to 2005,the budget for risk
adjusted distribution in Switzerland was between
SFR 1,039 and 1,163 billion. In 1996, the registered
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insurance companies created a solidarity fund re-
sponsible for risk adjustment in light of differential
risk pool problems.The formula is based on age and
gender of the insured. The suggestion is to include
other criteria such as the number of hospital treat-
ments per year. One interesting fact is that the distri-
bution within the group of net recipients and net con-
tributors is very disproportionate (Beck et al. 2003,
68f.). 62 health plans pay into the equalization fund
and 56 receive transfers. Most of the money (71 per-
cent) comes from only five sickness funds while five
funds receive more than 80 percent of the redistrib-
uted payments.The distribution of the payments into
and out of the equalization budget can be seen as an
expression of differences in the risk structure of the
health funds rather than the impact of market power.
The health care reform act of 1996 introduced pro
competitive changes in the market of sickness funds.
The legislator expected a higher mobility between
sickness funds of both the healthy and sick insured
as open enrolment was introduced with the new law.
That is why the risk adjustment scheme was initially
limited until 2005 and is still under discussion.
However, consumer mobility remained low and risk
selection strategies are still profitable.
Future trends
This risk-adjustment system has been the object of
criticism (Beck et al. 2003 or Leu and Beck 2007).
First, the problems are related to an imprecise
assessment of morbidity through the used indicators
age and gender.This indirect approach may result in
inhomogeneous risk categories and therefore leave
space for risk selection through health plans.Second,
the risk adjustment in Switzerland is calculated ret-
rospectively. Hence, it resembles a system of cost
refund in some sense which rewards management
inefficiency through higher transfers. Third and
related to the second point, health plans engaged in
managed care projects have disadvantages because it
might be more profitable to become involved in risk
selection than in a high-quality treatment strategy.
Fourth, the role of deductibles in the Swiss health
care system is not considered in the risk-adjustment
process.Through higher deductibles, it is possible to
get a reduction in the community-rated premium. If
these are preferred by the younger insured individu-
als and therefore the average health care expendi-
tures decrease, the transfer or premium subsidy for
the elderly insured increases even if their average
expenditures are unchanged.
Because of these shortcomings, the Swiss system has
been subject to a long debate centering on the ques-
tion whether or not the adjustment system has to be
completed through the incorporation of additional
health or morbidity indicators (Beck et al. 2006).
One possibility of an enhancement is to include the
hospital stays in the previous year,another to identi-
fy chronic diseases through the prescription of phar-
maceuticals (e.g., pharmaceutical cost groups). The
Swiss parliament (Ständerat) has discussed the two
issues and plans the incorporation of hospital stays
as an additional indicator of morbidity.7
It is interesting to notice that the Swiss government
has decided to modify the existing risk adjustment for-
mula moderately with an additional indicator but not
to apply a differentiated patient classification model as
is done in Germany or in the Netherlands or in parts
of the Medicare and Medicaid program in the US.
Beck et al. (2006) show that the inclusion of pharma-
ceutical cost groups goes along with only limited new
information.According to their calculations, currently
40 percent of the insured are favorable customers to
health plans whereas 18 percent are potentially dis-
criminated against. By introducing the new indicator
hospital stays in the last year, the numbers drop to 26
and 17 percent, respectively. Pharmaceutical cost
groups only show a slight effect (25 and 18 percent).
The study shows that the positive effects of engaging
in risk selection show decreasing rates of return while
the positive effects of managed care models and their
potential reduction of costs become more important.
The Netherlands
The Dutch health care system was until 2006 charac-
terized by a mixture of publicly and privately pro-
vided health insurance (Lamers,van Vliet and van de
Ven 2003).From 1962 to 2006,about two-third of the
population was covered by mandatory health insur-
ance (ZFW) that included acute medical care pro-
vided in hospitals, by general physicians and drug
prescriptions (Okma 2008). This social health insur-
ance system covered people in lower income brack-
ets.Among those who were not insured in the social
health insurance the predominant number of indi-
viduals had voluntary private insurance and only one
percent of the population was uninsured.
7 It is worth mentioning that only hospital stays of a minimum of
three days and stays because of births will enter the risk-adjust-
ment formula.In 2006, the Health Insurance Law introduced uni-
versal health insurance coverage for all legal resi-
dents of the Netherlands (national health insurance;
Douven 2007, 166; Okma 2008, 3). The basic health
insurance coverage is provided by about 40 insurers
from which the individuals can choose on their own.
Insurers have to accept each potential insured dur-
ing annual open enrollment periods. Payments to
insurers are twofold. First, the employers collect one
part of the contribution as earmarked taxation. In
2007, this was a share of 6.5 percent of taxable
income with a maximum of about EUR 1,950 per
month (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005).These contribu-
tions are collected by the tax department into a cen-
tral fund (health insurance fund; HIF). These
income-related contributions should reflect the
income solidarity between the consumers. The role
of this fund is to allocate the contributions to the
insurers, thereby taking into account the differences
in the risk structures. Hence, insurers will receive
risk-adjusted premium subsidies that compensate for
enrollees with predictably high medical expendi-
tures. By using these subsidies, in theory the incen-
tives for risk selection should decline. The second
source of contributions is a flat-rate premium that is
paid by the insured. Premium differences between
health plans are possible but individuals within the
same plan have to pay the same premium.8
Risk adjustment in the Netherlands
Risk-adjusted payments of the HIF to health insur-
ers can be divided into ex ante (prospective) capita-
tion payments and ex post (retrospective) payments
(Douven 2007, 173ff.).9 For the ex ante adjustment
several risk adjusters are used by the government.
The number of factors in the adjustment scheme has
increased over time. In 1991, the first rudimentary
adjustment system was introduced that relied on his-
torical expenditures only. In the following years,
adjusters like age, gender, urbanization and income
were introduced. The two major reforms took place
in the years 2002 and 2004. In 2002, pharmaceutical
cost groups (PCGs) and in 2004, diagnostic cost
groups (DCGs) were introduced. During this pro-
cess, historical expenditures were abolished as indi-
cators of morbidity.10
The idea behind the PCGs is to identify those indi-
viduals with indications of chronic health conditions
(Douven 2007, 178).The PCGs include those outpa-
tients who in the past received drug prescriptions
indicative of certain chronic conditions. From the
year 2006 on, seventeen conditions were used. The
annual ex ante payments to health plans vary
between EUR 332 for glaucoma and EUR 15,156 for
severe kidney problems. This morbidity indicator
raises incentive problems. It is possible that health
care providers and plans use their knowledge on the
capitation payments to alter their prescription
behavior and to aim at maximizing their payments.
In addition, providers and insurers might have an
interest in encouraging the prescription of those
drugs that fall into the PCG-system or to up code
patients into higher cost groups. To reduce these
incentives, the government imposed rules to assign
patients into the cost groups, e.g., to use the pre-
scribed daily doses instead of the number of pre-
scriptions.11
The diagnostic cost groups should account for the
high health care expenditures in the inpatient sector.
The basic idea is that persons with a serious hospi-
talization in the previous year have above-average
expenditures in the years after the treatment even if
the expenditure effect is diminishing over time. The
diagnosis groups are based on the ICD-9 codes and
a DCG is a cluster of diagnosis groups with compa-
rable future expenditures.The Dutch system consists
of thirteen DCGs with risk-adjusted payments from
EUR 1,293 to EUR 40,167. The incentives for
providers and health plans are similar to those
reported for the DCGs,namely to hospitalize people
more than necessary to obtain higher future risk-
adjusted premiums or to substitute outpatient for
inpatient treatment.Again,the government imposed
rules to restrict such behavior (see Douven 2007 for
details).
Besides the ex-ante payments,the Dutch health care
system also implemented an ex-post payment system
to correct the ex-ante budgets for sub-systems.
Hence, the financial risk of differences between ex
ante budgets and the actual expenditures is not born
by the health plans themselves but is due to the ex
post adjustment mechanism. The idea that health
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8 Moreover, the government pays the premium for those younger
than 18 years and families with low income are eligible for financial
subsidies (Okma 2008, 3).
9 The process of calculation for the ex ante payments consists of
five steps that are described in detail in Douven 2007.
10 In 2008, socioeconomic status was introduced as an additional
risk adjuster.
11 Other rules are that the prescription has to be related to a spe-
cific chronic condition and that the prescription in the previous
year was for more than 181 days (Douven 2007, 179). Moreover,
people can only be assigned to one PCG, and there must be a con-
sensus on the use of the drug.CESifo DICE Report 3/2008 43
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plans face higher risk goes back to the introduction
of the ex ante adjustment in 1991. Regulators had
concerns that the goal of more competition in the
social health insurance market would go hand in
hand with undesirable behaviors such as risk selec-
tion.Selection is favorable as long as an ex ante sys-
tem does not adequately adjust for the distribution
of different health risks among the competing
plans.Therefore,the ex post adjustment system with
retrospective payments is used to reduce these
incentives. In the Netherlands between 1991 and
2005 various ex ante schemes were introduced
(Douven 2007). First, a retrospective equalization
for which each plan has to transfer a percentage of
the difference between actual individual expendi-
tures and ex ante capitation payments into a pool.
All plans share the money in this pool except for
their own transfers. Second, with the high-risk
equalization,a percentage of all individual expendi-
tures above a threshold are transferred into a pool.
Again, this pool is equally shared among the plans.
Third,health plans pay or receive payments into the
retrospective compensation fund. Payments are
based on a fixed percentage of profits or losses, i.e.,
on the difference between risk-adjusted capitation
and the actual individual expenditures. Hence, the
retrospective compensation system can be seen as a
special form of risk-sharing.
Germany
The German risk-adjustment system (Risikostruk-
turausgleich RSA) was introduced with the 1993
Health Reform Act and since then only slightly mod-
ified.The German Federal (Social) Insurance Office
(Bundesversicherungsamt; BVA) is responsible for
implementation of the risk structure equalization,
which has been in force since 1994. The RSA is the
most extensive financial equalization procedure ever
to be set up among the social sickness funds. All
statutory health insurance funds participate in the
RSA and a total of about 215 health insurance funds
were involved in the 2007 equalization procedure.
The RSA equalizes the following risk structure-relat-
ed differences between the different health plans:
• Income differences due to the varying amounts of
the contributory income of the members of a
health plan.
• Expenditure differences due to the varying distri-
bution of morbidity risks among those insured in
a health plan, as well as the varying numbers of
non-contributing insured family members.
In order to determine the morbidity risks, the risk
factors, age, gender, sick pay claims and incapacity
for work are taken into consideration (Bundesver-
sicherungsamt 2008). Since 2003, registration in a
structured treatment program for the chronically
sick (DMP) has also been taken into account. The
financial transfer amounted to EUR 17 billion in the
2007 equalization procedure.
Risk adjustment in Germany
The German risk adjustment system aims at reduc-
ing existing inequalities in the contribution rates of
statutory sickness funds (health plans) due to
income differences and differences in the financial
needs of health plans due to variations in depen-
dents’ coverage and long-term disability risks
(Bundesversicherungsamt n.d., 2). From the view-
point of the legislator, the RSA should enable the
sickness funds to act as if they had the average risk
structure of the insured in their insurance pool.
Moreover, the incentive to gain advantages in the
competition between the different sickness funds
due to risk selection should be reduced. Lastly, risk-
adjustment payments can contribute to increase the
incentives for more efficiency in medical care and
patient’s supply.In its original design,the system was
based just on the factors age, gender, sick pay claims
and incapacity for work.It is important to notice that
even this simple risk adjustment system is already
morbidity-oriented and has the great advantage that
the applied risk adjusters are exogenous, e.g., cannot
be manipulated by the parties concerned.
Since 2002,the RSA is complemented by a risk pool.
The risk pool partially equalizes the financial bur-
dens for expensive treatment cases, going beyond
the mere indirect morbidity allocation up to now.
Approximately EUR 0.8 billion in financial funds
were transferred to the risk pool. At present, the
RSA contributes significantly to the convergence of
contribution rates between the different health
plans.12 Figure 1 shows the development of health
plan specific contribution rates. In 1996, the maxi-
12 In Germany, originally sickness funds (health plans) were divid-
ed in several classes: the most important are the local sickness
funds (AOK), the company health insurance funds (BKK), the
guild health insurance funds (IKK) and the substitute sickness
funds (EAN, blue-collar and white collar). Except for closed com-
pany health insurance funds,all other health plans are now open to
all the insured.mum difference between the plans was 4 percentage
points and decreased to less than one percentage
point in the year 2006.13 In addition,one can see how
the budget of the RSA has developed over time in
Figure 1. In 1996 it was EUR 10.5 billion and in-
creased to about EUR 17 billion in 2006.
In this system,the health plans’ influence on compe-
tition is limited by law. The basic benefit package is
standardized for all sickness funds. Selective con-
tracts are just emerging and are still far from substi-
tuting the existing collective contracts. Therefore,
one goal of health plans is to get as much out of the
RSA budget or pay as little as possible. This fact
might explain the rise in the RSA budget over the
last 10 years. Most of the payments into the RSA
come from the company health insurance funds
(BKK) and the substitute sickness funds (EAN)
whereas the local sickness funds (AOK) and the
smaller miner health plan benefit from billions of
euros they receive from the RSA.14
The German RSA does not work as ex post financial
equalization but as an ex ante system of transfers
between sickness funds.Therefore, differences in con-
tribution rates are still possible and even appreciated,
expressing at least in theory a varying efficiency
between health plans. In a world with an optimal risk
adjustment system, the remaining differences do not
express risk selection behavior of health plans but
varying competitive advantages
in contracting,administration and
scope of offered medical services
(Wille 1999,123).Generally,a risk
adjustment system is a regulation
of premiums or contribution ra-
tes, independent of its explicit de-
sign. Therefore, it can be viewed
as the basis for the goal of more
competition between health plans
(Cassel and Janßen 1999, 15f.;
Jacobs et al.2001;Lauterbach and
Wille 2001; IGES, Lauterbach
and Wasem 2004). The relevant
question concerning risk adjust-
ment in Germany’s statutory
health insurance (SHI) is not
whether such an adjustment system should be imple-
mented but how to design such a system in order to
support competition between health plans.
However,the current system of risk adjustment does
not accomplish the objectives fully and a more mor-
bidity based system of risk adjustment will be intro-
duced in 2009. It seems to be necessary to funda-
mentally develop the RSA further in order to
achieve a more precise distribution of the financial
burden of varying risk structures between health
plans.Therefore, in addition to the existing equaliza-
tion factors (age, gender, sick pay claims and inca-
pacity for work), as of 2009, the RSA shall also be
based on the morbidity groups determined by the
BVA in a classification model of insured persons.
The classification model allocates the insured per-
sons to morbidity groups on the basis of their inpa-
tient diagnoses and outpatient prescriptions,arriving
at a classification with similar medical expenses. In
the future, there will be risk surcharges for these
morbidity groups. The BVA calculates the compen-
sation amounts for the individual health plans two
times a year and transfers the amount to the new
central health fund. From the health fund a single
health plan then receives a uniform per capita pay-
ment for each insured person augmented by sur-
charges from the new risk adjustment system.
Future perspectives of the German RSA– the pros
and cons
Risk adjustment should drive competition between
health plans,which itself is an instrument to establish
efficiency and effectiveness in the health care sector.





























Source: German Federal (Social) Insurance Office (2008); Federal Ministry of Health (2008).
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTRIBUTION RATES AND THE RSA BUDGET
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Figure 1
13 It should be noted that the payments into and from the RSA as
well as the contribution rates may differ between the different
kinds of health plans. Moreover, if health plans are organized on a
regional basis (in contrast to federal plans) there are also regional
differences.
14 It is worth mentioning that differences remain between the dif-
ferent kinds of sickness funds. Some of the substitute funds and
company-based funds receive payments from the RSA as well.CESifo DICE Report 3/2008 45
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Figure 2 shows to what extent a risk adjustment sys-
tem can be seen as an instrument to reach the goal of
higher efficiency and effectiveness in the health care
market. Under this perspective, factors in the risk
adjustment formula should serve the criteria of valid-
ity, exogeneity, measurability, litigability, efficiency
and transparency (Breyer and Kifmann 2001, 25ff.).
It is obvious that the existing risk adjustment system
fails to meet all criteria at the same time (Cassel and
Janssen 1999, 21). No risk adjustment system is able
to perfectly balance the morbidity risks between the
different sickness funds (Schips 2005, 20). From an
economic point of view, priority is not given to a
maximum degree of redistribution among the sick-
ness funds but to an optimal one, taking also into
account the direct and indirect costs of a risk adjust-
ment system (Beck 2005).In general,it would be suf-
ficient to have a risk adjustment system concentrat-
ing on the variables that:
• cause significantly higher expenditures after re-
cting for exogenous variables like age and gender,
• are related to a relevant share of the insured indi-
viduals,
• significantly impact the contribution rate and
• show significant differences between the compet-
ing health plans (Meyers-Middendorf 1993, 364;
Pfaff and Wassener 1996, 166; Cassel and Janßen
1999, 21).
In a competitive environment the morbidity struc-
ture of a sickness fund is just one factor determining
its chances of success.Since other
factors are of similar importance,
e.g., market share, regional size
or scope for contracting an ad-
justment system that concentra-
tes only on the morbidity struc-
ture of the insured would miss
the point. More important is that
a broad spectrum of possibilities
can be offered to health care
suppliers and insured individu-
als. Maximizing returns from the
existing risk adjustment pool can
run contrary to the goal of fair
competition.
The German approach of placing
emphasis on equalizing the risk
structures of health plans and the
derived demand for a maximal
differentiated risk adjustment system is basically the
result of local health plans having insufficient free-
dom to maneuver. Without more competition in the
health care market,health care reforms concentrating
on the morbidity structure of the insured individuals
will overburden the risk adjustment system. Looking
at the SHI system as a whole,a risk adjustment system
is a zero-sum game that does not automatically guar-
antee an increase in efficiency.More competition is of
top priority, risk adjustment should not be overem-
phasized.
According to independent experts, the ongoing
debate about Germany’s RSA and about the accura-
cy of the transfer mechanism since the year 2000 can
be summarized as follows: Basically, the risk-adjust-
ment system is working and can be seen as an essen-
tial framework for competition in the SHI. But in
detail, there is bias because, firstly, those individuals
who change their health plans are the healthier ones.
Secondly,health plans that are committed to treating
patients with chronic illnesses face the risk of finan-
cial losses because for these patients health plans
receive only negative marginal returns from the
RSA. Hence, the incentive to supply services to the
chronically ill is limited.
One way to deal with these problems is to use a
broader range of indicators for patient’s morbidity.15
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Figure 2
15 A second possibility is to give health plans more scope in the
competition. By using this freedom, sickness funds my realize cost
savings and improvements in quality. Moreover, the need for plans
to concentrate on the distribution of the RSA budget is reduced
(Wille and Schneider 1999,Wille et al. 2007).In the 2001 reform of the RSA, the risk-adjustment
system was linked to disease management programs
(DMPs) and a pool for high risks was introduced
(Göpffarth 2004, 5ff.). Both instruments did not
show the desired improvements (Wille, Ulrich and
Schneider 2008) because health plans may not be
interested in high quality DMPs and the financial
losses of high risks are mitigated but not completely
removed by introducing a risk pool.
Since 2004 ideas, based on scientific research, for a
further differentiation of the RSA and the criteria
for risk-adjustment have been proposed (IGES et al.
2004).An insured classification model has been sug-
gested in which surcharges on the basis of hospital
diagnoses (IPHCC, Inpatient Hierarchical Condi-
tion Catagories) and on the basis of pharmaceutical
components (RxGroups) are used as morbidity char-
acteristics.
In the health care reform act of the year 2007 (GKV-
WSG), it is intended that 50–80 cost-intensive chron-
ic diseases are used as indicators. These are diseases
with average treatment expenditures per insured that
are at minimum 50 percent higher than expenditures
for all insured. Beginning with the 1 January 2009,
major changes will affect the SHI in Germany.
Besides the introduction of a morbidity-based RSA,a
new remuneration system for outpatient physicians, a
new framework for hospitals and, finally, the imple-
mentation of a health fund with a nationwide contri-
bution rate. The latter is deeply intertwined with the
morbidity-based RSA. Risk-adjusted surcharges for
ill individuals and very expensive treatments will be
paid to the different health plans. Therefore, a list of
80 illnesses has been prepared including, e.g., HIV,
breast cancer,diabetes and osteoporosis.With this list,
the complexity of the whole RSA system is growing.
Up to now,mostly calendar age and gender have been
used as variables influencing the distribution of rev-
enues. Independent of whether, e.g., a woman ages 42
is ill or not, the receiving health plan receives an
amount of EUR 1,151 (Staeck 2008). In the new sys-
tem,the morbidity of the community of policyholders
of a health plan is the basis for the adjustment. The
monetary requirements in the morbidity-based RSA
are calculated using the average standardized expen-
ditures for the insured with one or more diseases.
For a working system a classification algorithm is
needed that assigns the insured to the morbidity cat-
egories. If this algorithm is imprecise, this leads to a
bias because, e.g., a health plan with a high number
of critically ill persons might receive insufficient
transfers from the health fund. In such a case, the
plan has to charge an extra contribution from its
members (Igel and Schaufler 2006).
It is therefore crucial for the new morbidity-based
RSA that the classification algorithm is a transpar-
ent and comprehensible one. This may lead to the
achievement of one central goal of a risk-adjustment
system, namely that competition for the health
insured is replaced by competition for the best treat-
ment strategies. But even if distortions in competi-
tion are reduced due to morbidity-based factors in
the adjustment scheme, the classification algorithm
will remain more or less rough.16
One problem with a detailed morbidity-based
adjustment system is that lack of transparency may
create incentives for manipulation (e.g., up coding).
For a large group of people such as the German SHI-
insured individuals,it is impossible to check whether
a former chronic disease has been resolved. It is
planned to introduce additional set screws but no
information about their accuracy is available at pre-
sent. For outpatient care, the insured has to provide
at least two diagnoses for a disease within two dif-
ferent quarters of a year. Moreover, the additional
financial resources from the RSA reform can only be
paid out if, e.g., a patient suffering from pneumonia
has a prescription of at least ten daily doses for a cer-
tain drug. For selected chronic diseases, a period of
183 sickness days is required. Because of the uncer-
tainty about the future revenues in the year 2009,
health plans might reassess or even discharge their
group contracts. Hence, the morbidity-based RSA
may impose negative incentives with respect to inte-
grated health care and individual contracts.
Lessons to learn from international experiences
Especially in an extended risk-adjustment system,
players may seek to increase the transfers from or to
diminish payments into the system.17 The resources
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16 A health plan might receive high payments for a simple and a
comparatively cheap disease and too little for expensive treat-
ments. For a patient with bronchial asthma and COPD (Chronic
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease), a plan gets the same morbidity
surcharge, independent of whether the treatment was for an in- or
outpatient.
17 The scientific advisory board of the company-based sickness
funds (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Betrieblichen Krankenver-
sicherung) is worried about the possibility that health plans will
engage in maximizing their transfers or minimizing their payments
in a more morbidity-based adjustment system (Wissenschaftlicher
Beirat der Betrieblichen Krankenversicherung 2006, 3).CESifo DICE Report 3/2008 47
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used to reach these financial goals are economically
non-productive and inefficient, and can be summa-
rized as rent-seeking activities.18 In contrast to pri-
vate health insurance markets, competition parame-
ters (e.g.,selective contracting or additional services)
have been missing in social health insurance systems
up to now. Therefore, health plans largely rely on
redistributive transfers from the risk adjustment sys-
tem.In Germany,the RSA can be seen as the largest
redistribution system in the health care market.
Whether the extension of the existing system by
introducing more direct morbidity-indicators will
produce higher rent-seeking activities or not remains
unclear.However,in combination with the new mor-
bidity-based remuneration of physician services both
health plans and providers may have an interest in
up coding sickness cases (Klusen and Pütz 2006).
One argument for the extension of risk adjustment
systems is to impede health plans engaging in risk
selection. If the choice of health plans is based on
individual preferences,moving between health plans
may not be viewed as an efficiency problem.As long
as every individual is free to change his health plan
without suffering a financial loss self selection seems
to be more of a fairness than an efficiency problem.
The inclusion of soft and possibly endogenous indi-
cators like hospital diagnoses and pharmaceutical
prescriptions leads to an adjustment system that is
characterized by bureaucracy,control intensity and a
lack of incentives for prevention. In combination
with the morbidity-based remuneration system for
outpatient care and Diagnosis Related Groups
(DRGs) in hospitals this leads to a bias in favor of
therapeutic services. Hence, providers and health
plans may have a common interest in “generating
morbidity” that is refunded by the adjustment sys-
tem. Hence, in a system with maximum risk adjust-
ment there is a lack of incentives to invest in pre-
vention. This is in contrast to the intention of the
German government to establish prevention as a
fourth cornerstone – besides acute care, rehabilita-
tion and long-term care – of the health system.
From an international perspective, there are a vari-
ety of risk adjustment systems that could be applied
or at least included in the German reform debate.
More precisely, there are numerous alternatives to a
differentiated risk adjustment system with advan-
tages vis-à-vis controllability, practicability, and
administrative efficiency,as well as transparency and
acceptance. Our primary concern is to have these
alternatives at least included in the ongoing German
reform debate. As is evident from experience in
other countries a morbidity-based risk adjustment
system which is all-dominant does not exist,meaning
that numerous adjustments are still being imple-
mented ex-post in all analyzed countries. In contrast
to the health insurance systems in the United States,
the Netherlands and Switzerland, in the existing
statutory health insurance system in Germany the
health plans have relatively few risk selection tools,
meaning that greater differentiation in the risk
adjustment system to avoid this danger is not a basic
necessity.
Within the framework of competition the morbidity
structure of the insured is just one factor which
determines a sickness fund’s market opportunities.
Additional competition-relevant parameters in-
clude, for instance, the market share and the region-
al density of the sickness fund.At present, the main
obstacles to efficient competition within the SHI sys-
tem are less an inadequate morbidity-oriented risk
adjustment system than the absence of adequate
competition parameters in the contract and benefits
sector. For efficient competition it is necessary to
have more discretionary power for sickness funds
and benefit providers accompanied by decentraliza-
tion at the decision-making level. This means that
allocation decisions are shifted away from joint and
uniform decisions towards a system of more selec-
tive contracts. Otherwise, there is a danger that the
maximum risk adjustment system will become over-
loaded. At most, this would generate distributional
effects, but no gains in efficiency or improvements
with respect to effectiveness.
Conclusion
In 1996,the German statutory health insurance mar-
ket was opened to competition. People insured were
now allowed to choose their health plan freely. To
avoid adverse selection, an obligation to contract
was introduced for all health plans and, moreover, a
risk adjustment system based on age, gender, sick
pay claims and incapacity for work was introduced
to offset comparative advantages/disadvantages
resulting from differences in risk structures.
18 Rent-seeking describes activities of individuals, employers or
interest groups that aim at influencing the decisions made by the
government in their own interest (Connolly and Munroe 1999). In
detail, they seek to generate rent and achieve redistribution goals
through their impact on the decision-makers.Empirical results (Knaus and Nuscheler 2002) show
that the existing risk adjustment system in Germany
is incomplete in the sense that after 1996 there was a
transition towards the company-based sickness
funds (BKKs) attracting the newly insured with low
contribution rates. This raises doubts whether the
existing scheme is able to control for varying risk
structures and whether the existing scheme should
be advanced to have a more direct morbidity orien-
tation.A more direct morbidity-oriented risk adjust-
ment is found in various other countries, e.g. the US,
the Netherlands and Switzerland.
From 2009 on, a patient classification model will be
introduced into the German system.The classification
model allocates the insured individuals to 80 morbid-
ity groups on the basis of their inpatient diagnoses
and outpatient prescriptions, arriving at a classifica-
tion with similar medical expenses.In the future,there
will be risk surcharges for these 80 chronic and expen-
diture intensive morbidity groups. Estimation as-
sumes that about EUR 20 billion will be distributed
among health plans according to the new system.The
German system will be unique in as much that most
other countries hardly redistribute such a great
amount of money on a nationwide basis.
As is evident from experience in other countries, an
ex ante morbidity-based risk adjustment system
which is all-dominant does not exist, meaning that
numerous adjustments are still being implemented
ex post in all analyzed countries. All countries are
working on fine-tuning their techniques and formu-
las, but they all have been doing this for years and
still face challenges.The interesting question is what
would happen if a country was able to find the right
risk adjustment and make the system “fair”. The
result would be health plans that are all average.
Such a perfectly differentiated risk adjustment sys-
tem would eliminate any reason for a sickness fund
to invest in keeping their insured healthy, to effec-
tively manage care, to seek out the best providers
and help them to deliver the most cost-effective care.
Instead, it would de-motivate insurers since there
would be no reason to minimize costs if there were
no financial reward for success. Rather, the danger
would be that health plans will slash costs or elimi-
nate disease management programs. A risk adjust-
ment system is a kind of backstop to ensure that risk
selection will not pay off. However, some insurers
will always try to get ahead. For the task of an insur-
er to keep the insured healthy,we do not need a per-
fect risk adjustment but an optimal one, giving
health plans the freedom to contract individually
and to offer additional services and rewarding those
sickness funds that do their business well.
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